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REAPING THE ADVANTAGES OF INFORMATION AND 
MODERN TECHNOLOGY: MOVING FROM BUREAUCRACY 
TO HYPERARCHY AND NETCENTRICITY  
Fred Thompson and L. R. Jones 
ABSTRACT 
This article focuses on the inherent contradiction between the basic building block of 
most non-market productive relationships – hierarchy – and the vision inspired by the 
architecture of modern information technology, especially the World Wide Web, of a 
more egalitarian culture in public organizations. Evans and Wurster (1997) have 
argued that, in the future, all knowledge-based productive relationships will be 
designed around fluid, team-based collaborative communities, either within 
organizations (deconstructed value chains), or collaborative alliances like the 
“amorphous and permeable corporate boundaries characteristic of companies in the 
Silicon Valley” (deconstructed supply chains). They assert that, in these relationships 
everyone will communicate richly with everyone else on the basis of shared standards 
and that, like the Internet itself, these relationships will eliminate the need to channel 
information, thereby eliminating the tradeoff between information bandwidth and 
connectivity. “The possibility (or the threat) of random access and information 
symmetry,” they conclude, “will destroy all hierarchies, whether of logic or power.” 
We believe that we ignore the views such visionaries as Evans and Wurster at our peril. 
The World Wide Web, together with the canon that two heads are better than one, has 
created something immensely interesting and potentially transformative. The genius of 
the World Wide Web is, as Evans and Wurster explain, that it is (a) distributed (so that 
anyone can contribute to it), and (b) standardized (so that everyone else can 
comprehend the contributions). Random access and information symmetry jeopardize 
the power of gatekeepers of all sorts: political leaders, managers, functional staff 
specialists, and even experts to determine what information counts as evidence and 
what beliefs are sufficiently warranted to count as knowledge. In other words, they 
threaten nearly everyone with a vested interest in existing institutional arrangements. 
One does not expect folks to surrender position or power without a struggle. 
Furthermore, homo sapiens’ need for leaders is evidently instinctive, deeply rooted in 
our simian brains. The need for hierarchy buttresses the status quo, even where the 
powerful are neither wise nor unselfish. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In an international context, public management arrangements differ significantly from 
country to country, but also regionally and locally. One reason for these differences may 
be different civic cultures with differing views of the state and its institutions. This may 
appear to be obvious, but it is highly important when public management reform models 
are proposed and transferred from one country to others such as was the case (and still is 
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to some extent -- especially from developed to developing nations) with, for example, 
the new public management. Scholars in public management as well as international 
practitioners should be aware of the impact civic culture has on the possibilities and 
limits of concept transfer between different jurisdictions.  
Having advanced this view, one precondition for a better consideration of cultural 
elements in public management reform is a better understanding of culture itself. 
Among the public management community, cultural theory has gained considerable 
attention. There are, however, other concepts for the analysis of cultural factors that 
may be relevant have not been explored to any great extent. To guide this exploration 
we suggest the following questions: 
• What are the effects of civic culture on public management reform, and what 
are the effects of reform on civic culture? 
• What is the influence of religious concepts on public management 
arrangements? 
• New public management's lingua franca is English. This is, non-English 
speaking countries have had to translate the concept into their own language. 
What is the impact of this fact on different understandings of public 
management reform concepts and processes worldwide? 
• How and through which processes do different cultures influence public 
management governance arrangements? 
In this article we address theses questions through concentration on the rationale for and 
methods of adoption of emergent technologies in public organizations, with emphasis 
on the role and impact of new information technology (IT) and its influence on 
organizational design and behavior. 
Contemporary public sector organizations are changing significantly as they embrace 
information and other modern technologies to become more effective in meeting the 
service preferences of citizens. Part of this transition involves reformulation of thinking 
about organizational design. We argue that to become more effective many public 
organizations must respond to changes in their environments to respond to the more 
contingent nature of the contexts in which they operate. Some of the increase in 
contingency, and consequent greater uncertainty faced by public organizations with 
respect to how to respond, results from fairly dramatic shifts in culture that affect citizen 
public service preferences. Other factors influencing contingency and response include 
the new economics of organizations, globalization of economies and increased 
international market competition, demographic and workforce composition changes and 
the rapid pace of development of new technologies, especially information technology 
(IT). The fundamental problem for most public organization is how to modify their 
design and structure to better accommodate environmental and cultural change and to 
operate more effectively in consort with other organizations, including those in the non-
profit and private sectors. 
This article focuses on the inherent contradiction between the basic building block of 
most non-market productive relationships – hierarchy – and the vision inspired by the 
architecture of modern information technology, especially the World Wide Web, of a 
more egalitarian culture in public organizations. Evans and Wurster (1997) have argued 
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that, in the future, all knowledge-based productive relationships will be designed around 
fluid, team-based collaborative communities, either within organizations (deconstructed 
value chains), or collaborative alliances like the “amorphous and permeable corporate 
boundaries characteristic of companies in the Silicon Valley” (deconstructed supply 
chains). They assert that, in these relationships everyone will communicate richly with 
everyone else on the basis of shared standards and that, like the Internet itself, these 
relationships will eliminate the need to channel information, thereby eliminating the 
tradeoff between information bandwidth and connectivity. “The possibility (or the 
threat) of random access and information symmetry,” they conclude, “will destroy all 
hierarchies, whether of logic or power.” 
We believe that we ignore the views such visionaries as Evans and Wurster at our peril. 
The World Wide Web, together with the canon that two heads are better than one, has 
created something immensely interesting and potentially transformative. The genius of 
the World Wide Web is, as Evans and Wurster explain, that it is (a) distributed (so that 
anyone can contribute to it), and (b) standardized (so that everyone else can comprehend 
the contributions). Random access and information symmetry jeopardize the power of 
gatekeepers of all sorts: political leaders, managers, functional staff specialists, and even 
experts to determine what information counts as evidence and what beliefs are 
sufficiently warranted to count as knowledge. In other words, they threaten nearly 
everyone with a vested interest in existing institutional arrangements. One does not 
expect folks to surrender position or power without a struggle. Furthermore, homo 
sapiens’ need for leaders is evidently instinctive, deeply rooted in our simian brains 
(Heifetz, 1993). The need for hierarchy buttresses the status quo, even where the 
powerful are neither wise nor unselfish. 
To understand the conflict between hierarchical arrangements and the vision inspired by 
contemporary technology and the possible outcomes of this conflict, we will look 
closely at cases based upon recent encounters with e-government in the United States: 
the 2004 presidential election, and the American military’s development of a world-
wide information grid. These two cases were selected because they are at the leading 
edge of e-government owing both to the scale and scope of the activities in question and 
the resources lavished upon them.  
 
CULTURE CHANGE CONCEPTUALIZED  
IN THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ORGANZATION 
The basic idea behind the new economics of organization is that the comparative 
advantage of governance mechanisms boils down to a question of information or 
transaction costs “and to the ability and willingness of those affected by information 
costs to recognize and bear them” (Arrow: 1969; Coase, 1937). Hence, the 
circumstances which create market failures: public goods, natural monopolies, 
externalities, moral hazard and adverse selection, etc., the problems that justify 
government action in a capitalist economy, are all fundamentally information failures. 
Markets could deliver public goods, for example – if information technology existed 
that would permit free riders to be profitably excluded from enjoying them. Monopolies 
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could be compensated to behave like competitors -- if information costs were lower. 
And, bargaining between self-interested individuals could eliminate externalities, 
without the intervention of government -- if transaction costs were zero. Much the same 
logic applies to the choice between organizations and markets and the kinds of 
governance mechanisms used within organizations. 
A corollary to this basic Coasian insight is that information costs – typically search, 
bargaining, logistics, and/or enforcement costs – can be reduced by carrying them out 
through formal mechanisms of governance: organizations rather than markets or 
government rather than private organizations. Reduction does not imply elimination, 
however. This fact implies a second, perhaps, less obvious corollary to the basic 
Coasian insight: the conditions that wreck markets will also impair organizations and 
governments. Consequently, as Robert Gibbons (2003) explains, the organizations we 
observe tend to be less efficient than the markets we observe, even though they are more 
efficient than the markets they replace; the government agencies we observe tend to be 
less efficient than the private organizations we observe, even though they are more 
efficient than the private organizations they replace.  
Gibbons’ corollary to the basic Coasian insight is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the 
declining efficacy of markets, organizations, and government as transactions difficulty 
increases. At the critical values of transaction difficulty shown by the dotted lines, 
markets and organizations and organizations and governments are both equally 
efficacious; to the right of first vertical dotted line, organizations are more efficient than 
markets; to the right of the second, government is more efficient than private 
organizations. 
The evidence seems to support Gibbons’ corollary. Where the production of privately 
consumed goods and services – steel, banking, even telecommunications – is concerned, 
private organizations are usually observed to be more efficient than state-owned 
enterprises. Finally, it also might be noted that Gibbons’ corollary is entirely consistent 
with the observation: reducing the cost of information should increase the efficacy of 
markets relative to organizations and of non-governmental organizations relative to 
government. Because, improved communications technology, logistics, and IT have all 
reduced the cost of information, it is reasonable to infer that both sets of vertical dotted 
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   Source: Thompson, 2006, 67. 
This observation most emphatically does not mean, however, that the most efficient 
technology, let alone set of social/institutional relationships, must necessarily win out in 
the end. Technological development is not a coldly rational, self-regulating economic 
process, which proceeds automatically along a singular path. Even if one sets aside the 
contested nature of efficiency, the evolution of social constructs is precisely analogous 
to natural selection, a process that is inherently path dependent, a fact made patently 
obvious by English spelling in the first case and the platypus in the second. For our 
purposes we accept Paul David's (1985) definition path-dependence in the following 
manner: “A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important 
influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, 
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systemic forces.” (332) 
In other words, economic arrangements are partly a function of systemic change; but 
they are a function of random, fortuitous events as well. Moreover, systematic forces 
include culture, position, and power – people, institutions, and competing values -- and 
not merely payoffs. 
Moreover, the evolution of social constructs is not entirely a Darwinian process but is at 
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arrangements to suit felt needs and wants. We shape economic arrangements, social 
relationships, and technological developments at the same time they shape us. 
Instead, we would stress the normative power of these observations: not that Y will 
cause X, but that if you want Y, you should do X. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) provide 
compelling evidence that computers do increase performance: where both are compared 
to industry averages, an eight percent increase in IT assets is associated with a one 
percent increase productivity. They emphasize, however, that the payoff to IT 
investment varies substantially across firms, even in the same industries. Measurement 
error may explain some of this variation. IT measurement focuses on tangible assets -- 
hardware and, in some cases, software. Intangible assets -- investments in human 
capital, business process reengineering, and organizational culture -- are usually 
overlooked, although in successful IT projects, systems implementation and deployment 
typically account for 75 percent of total project costs. In explaining this phenomenon, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt stress not the level of effort given to IT systems implementation 
and deployment but the manner in which systems are implemented and deployed. They 
argue that if we want the high productivity that IT promises, it is not sufficient to invest 
in computers and software, our organizations must also adopt a specific relational 
architecture, set of processes or routines, and culture.  
Brynjolfsson and Hitt refer to this pattern of practices as the digital or netcentric 
organization. They insist that IT and digital organization are complements: firms that 
simultaneously adopt the digital organization and invest more in IT have 
disproportionately higher performance. They imply that adopting any of the seven 
practices of highly effective netcentric organizations in isolation may actually hurt 
performance, although their evidence speaks only to a couple of the practices and to 
investment in computers. Five of the characteristics of digital or netcentric organizations 
are often found in high performance organizations, especially those operating in 
hazardous environments that call for high reliability on the part of their members 
(Weick & Sutcliffe 2001). These organizations consistently maintain focus and 
communicate goals, foster information access and communication throughout the 
organization, link incentives to performance, hire the best people, and invest in human 
capital (Pfeffer 1998; see also Ichniowski & Shaw 2003; Dixit 2002; Lazear 2000; Ashe 
1990).  
Moving from analog to digital processes and distributing decision-rights to front-line 
personnel are the practices that truly distinguish the netcentric organization from more 
traditional bureaucracies. The first is inconceivable without computers; the second is a 
recipe for disaster where people lack a clear sense of mission and the motivation, 
capacity and information needed to accomplish it. It makes sense that implementing 
either of these practices in isolation could degrade organizational performance. The 
architecture that distinguishes the netcentric organization from more traditional 
bureaucracies was, perhaps, first clearly articulated by Hammer (1990) in his rules for 
business process reengineering: 
• Jobs should be designed around missions and goals rather than functions 
(functional specialization and sequential execution are inherently inimical to 
efficient processing);  
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• Those who use the output of an activity should perform the activity; the 
people who produce information should process it, since they have the greatest 
need for information and the greatest interest in its accuracy;  
• Information should be captured once and at the source;  
• Parallel activities should be coordinated during their performance, not after 
they are completed;  
• The people who do the work should be responsible for making decisions and 
control built into their job designs. 
Moving from analog to digital processes means reconfiguring processes to exploit the 
power of IT to perform a variety of tasks rather than merely using IT to perform steps in 
existing processes. This is not a new problem nor is it necessarily an easy one. First the 
technology must be ready. Then someone must grasp its full potential and figure out 
how to configure work to extract every advantage from it. Here the early history of the 
moving assembly line in the American automobile industry is instructive. Its 
development required two fundamental technological advances that took decades to 
achieve: tougher metals, which were needed to make jigs and bits for high-precision 
cutting, turning, boring, milling, and stamping machines, and small-scale electric 
motors, which were needed to run them. High-precision manufacturing machines were 
needed to produce interchangeable parts and small-scale motors to liberate workflow 
from the tyranny of a single central source of motive power and the need to transmit it 
via belts, shafts, and gears. These were necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the 
invention of the moving automobile assembly line. Both were put in place when Ford 
Motor’s Highland Park plant was designed in 1910. It wasn’t until 1914, however, that 
its managers and engineers fully grasped the potential of interchangeable parts and 
machines run by small-scale electric motors and reorganized automobile manufacturing 
accordingly, doubling the plant’s productivity at a stroke. The actual reorganization 
took only a few months. Recognizing the possibilities inherent in the new technologies 
and figuring out how to take advantage of them took years. It then took additional 
decades for the processes pioneered by Ford to become widespread throughout 
automobile industry and to be adopted in other industries. Given this story, it is, 
perhaps, no surprise that the industry that has most fully exploited the power of IT is the 
IT industry itself. 
Every social construct has precedents. Hammer’s rules reflected not only the promise of 
IT but also the assumptions underlying Toyota’s system of flexible production, which 
had invited considerable attention from students of organizational design in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Toyota’s system was intended to reduce work-in-progress 
inventories and manufacturing cycle time and increase product quality, thereby 
increasing economic value added by conserving both plant and equipment and working 
capital. The Toyota system of the 1990s embodied the view that nobody but the front-
line worker adds value, that front-line workers can perform most functions better than 
specialists, and that every link in the value chain should be perfect (Womack, Jones, 
Roos, 1990). This system, which had also been pioneered by IBM and Bell Labs in the 
United States, featured several of the elements of netcentric organizations: 
multidisciplinary teams, whose members work together from start of job to completion 
of a project, the devolution of power down to teams that do an organization's work, and 
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a more equal distribution of knowledge, authority, and responsibility. With the addition 
of computers and digital processes and the system was complete. 
To support the importance of sustaining multidisciplinary teams, teamwork and equal 
distribution of knowledge as a critical element of Toyata's netcentric-oriented 
organizational success, when this system was weakened, Toyota began to experience 
uncharacteristic problems in sustaining production quality. Preserving the company' 
reputation for quality became a significant issue in July, 2006 when Toyota announced 
the need to recall vehicles due to various problems. The issue became a national scandal 
when Japanese police accused Toyota executives of concealing product defects over an 
eight year period (International Herald Tribune, 2006). At the same time another 
Japanese corporate giant, Sony, recalled a large number of faulty computer laptop 
batteries and admitted to production quality control failures. These incidents led to a 
national debate in Japan in 2006 over the issue of whether the quality of industrial 
production, quality control, worker incentives, and even the quality of Japanese school 
systems, had weakened substantially.   
Explanations for these lapses in quality of production and control ranged from criticism 
of deterioration in the work ethic of Japanese workers to the influence of introduction of 
Western-style management methods. Thus it was reported: 
Some have also begun to blame the decline on recent American-style 
management changes, like performance-based pay, the end of 
traditional life-time job guarantees and increased use of temporary 
workers in order to cut costs. Many economists and corporate 
managers now say these changes, adopted in the 1990s as Japan 
groped for ways to revive its floundering economy, sapped employee 
morale and frayed the sense of teamwork that underpins a 
commitment to quality (International Herald Tribune, 2006, 14). 
For example, in 1993 Fujitsu adopted a performance-based pay system (PBP). 
However, by the mid-2000 the firm abandoned the system, returning to an emphasis on 
group performance. Thus, computer systems and netcentric methods work only in 
tandem with employee education and training, and proper systems of motivation. 
Indeed, by the mid-2000s many American firms and public sector entities had phased 
out performance-based pay systems and the academic community had thoroughly 
debunked the efficacy of such approaches, finding that PBP had damaged worker 
productivity due to the introduction of compensation inequities of various types 
(International Herald Tribune, 2006, 14). 
With these lessons in mind we may observe that the power of netcentric organization to 
transform productivity is dependent on a number of variables, including good human 
resource management. The role of new technology in enhanced productivity is highly 
evident as was first demonstrated in the computer industry. Many of the characteristics 
of netcentric organizations were already common practice in this industry by the 1990s. 
Owing to their technological expertise, its leaders were themselves well positioned to 
grasp the possibilities inherent in the technology and to figure out how to reconfigure 
basic business processes to take advantage of them, although actually doing so often 
took many years. IBM’s Business Continuity and Recovery Services facility in Dallas, 
Texas, was an early example of a complete netcentric organization. It explicitly 
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mimicked the self-organization of markets. Everyone was either a customer or provider, 
depending on the transaction, which transformed the facility into a network of voluntary 
exchanges and substantially boosted productivity. 
Can government copy the netcentric model, organizing itself into alliances of networks, 
sharing top management and core competencies, investing in multi-disciplinary 
teamwork and a common culture, and using computers to chart activities and 
operational flows? Can it use real-time information on operations made possible by 
modern IT systems to pass the exercise of judgment down into the organization, to 
wherever it is most needed, at service delivery, in production, or to the client? Can 
government abandon its hierarchies, its need to push operating decisions to the top of 
the organization, or its stove-piped functional organizations? Can it consistently 
maintain focus and communicate goals, foster information access and communication 
throughout the organization, link incentives to performance, hire the best people, and 
invest in human capital, as well as computers and software? The benefits are there, but 
so too are the costs. Adopting the netcentric organization is problematic in several ways, 
two of which are crucial: lack of understanding that certain practices matter and that 
these practices must be adopted together, as part of a complementary system, and the 
unwillingness of the people at the top to share authority. 
 
NETCENTRICITY AND THE 2004 U. S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
Electoral campaigns may seem a trivial test of netcentric principles. But American 
presidential campaigns involve millions of volunteers, thousands of professionals, and 
billions of dollars. Moreover, for many elected officials, campaign leadership is the only 
executive experience they ever get. Lacking other executive experience, what they learn 
on the campaign trail strongly influences administrative practices in office. Political 
campaigns are also endowed with certain of the characteristics that facilitate the 
adoption of netcentric architectures: a clear focus and shared sense of purpose, open 
communication throughout the organization, and bright, intrinsically motivated 
participants. 
A survey of candidates’ websites in the presidential primaries clearly demonstrated that 
most simply used the net as an alternate channel for information available via other 
media. Use of this channel undoubtedly facilitated communication with the ten to 12 
percent of the population that relies of the World Wide Web for news and with 
reporters, who tend to be fairly net savvy. Many reporters find it easier to take 
information from press releases on the Internet than from faxes and to use the web to 
search through position papers for inconsistencies and to compare and contrast the 
stances of the candidates. There were two salient exceptions to this generalization, 
however: Howard Dean’s use of the web to identify likely supporters and to ask them 
for money and the Bush campaign’s use of the internet to get out the vote on Election 
Day. 
The Dean campaign was remarkable for its ability to raise funds from small donors 
(<$US250). Democrats have customarily relied more heavily on very large donors – 
wealthy individuals, trial lawyers, and teachers’ unions primarily – and federal 
matching funds than have Republicans, who have relied primarily on direct mail 
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campaigns to raise funds. The Dean campaign was so good at raising money that it 
could afford to forgo federal matching funds (along with the spending limits they 
entailed) and eventually announced that it would no longer accept large individual and 
corporate donations. While the Dean campaign failed (many of its IT workers were 
recruited for John Kerry’s presidential campaign, where they ultimately substantially 
contributed to the Democrats’ success in matching Republican campaign spending), 
Howard Dean was later elected Chairman of the Democratic Party. Under Dean, the 
Democratic Party has raised two dollars for every three raised by the Republicans, 
despite its incumbency advantage. As Chairman, Dean has relied on the precisely the 
same organizational and IT know-how that carried him a surprise lead early in the race 
for the Democratic nomination for the presidency for his successes – his failures have 
largely been the result of an inability to keep his feet out of his mouth, also just as 
before. 
Openness has been one of the keys to Dean’s success in the use of the Internet for 
campaign purposes. The Republicans and, initially, the Kerry campaign merely solicited 
e-mail responses to their press releases and position papers. Most messages received an 
automatic reply appealing for support. In contrast, Dean’s campaign network classified 
and posted the comments to the web and invited responses from viewers. They also 
asked viewers to copy comments to friends and to invite them to link to Meetup.com. 
This had the effect of creating an extensive community of online participants; according 
to the Toronto Star (October 19, 2004, 27), over 13,000 in April 2003, 61,000 in July, 
and 110,000 in October. Meetup.com peaked in February 2004, with 189,000 
participants. 
Furthermore, potential active supporters identified themselves through their willingness 
to participate in the on-line community. Only then did the Dean campaign solicit their 
support. Not surprisingly, the response rate to Dean’s solicitations was between four 
and ten times higher than his competitors’. Of course, this meant that the Dean 
campaign organization had to mobilize and train a large number of individuals to 
monitor traffic on the web, identify potential supporters, and tailor appeals for support 
to them. It also meant that the campaign had to use its computers to chart volunteer 
activities and communications traffic so that it could afford to pass the exercise of 
judgment down into the organization to the volunteers communicating directly with the 
other members of the online community. As Democratic Party Chairman, Dean has 
installed this same system. Perhaps its most astonishing feature is that most volunteers 
supply their computers and work from their own homes, schools, or offices. 
The Republican effort to get out the vote on Election Day was every bit as fascinating. 
The problem both parties face is insuring that likely supporters actually vote. Both 
parties maintain extensive databases on registered voters, paying special attention to 
party members and independents, especially identified supporters and those with 
characteristics that would predict their support at the polls. They also try to determine 
who has voted and who has not and to encourage those who haven’t to do so. This 
means reminding voters with absentee ballots to mail them in, monitoring polling places 
to identify those who have not voted and phoning or visiting the laggards to persuade 
them to vote. In presidential elections, special attention is usually given to potential 
supporters who vote intermittently in by elections. 
 
  
International Public Management Review - electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 9  Issue 1  2008  © International Public Management Network 
158 
 
Forty years ago this process relied heavily on local organization and local knowledge. 
Data, which are now typically supplied in digital format by county clerks and frequently 
updated, often in real time, and warehoused by the national party organization, were 
laboriously coded by hand on note cards maintained at the precinct level. While a few 
well-organized patronage machines could rely on street-level adherents to know their 
constituencies so intimately they could predict not only who would vote but also how, 
most simply maximized turnout, leaving it to the fates to sort things out. The electoral 
advantages that accrued to large-scale, centralized data base management transformed 
this process. When voter data was combined with modern political/market research, 
including push polling, and the use of giant call centers, national campaign managers 
could determine which voters to target to maximize the vote count in their favor given 
the volunteer resources available. This had the result of reducing overall turnout vis á 
vis earlier times, but of increasing the predictability of outcomes. It also resulted in the 
centralization of the process. In 2004 the Democrats relied on this basic process, using 
the Internet to transmit orders to volunteers in the field and to check on results. 
In contrast, the Republicans used the Internet to transform the process. They made data 
on voters, their intentions and their propensities, information from the phone banks and 
polling places available to local volunteers and relied upon them to interpret the data 
and to use the Internet to coordinate their own efforts. To participate in this process all 
interested volunteers had to do was enter their zip codes on a webpage: the system 
provided a targeted list of neighborhood voters, a map showing the locations of their 
residences, estimates of the time required to visit them, and a set of talking points. The 
rest was up to the volunteers. In other words, the Republicans used the Internet to 
distribute information and decision-rights to front-line personnel and depended upon 
them to figure out how to leverage the resources available locally. As a result, 
Republican volunteers were consistently faster off the mark and responded more 
appropriately to the emerging situation than their more centrally directed Democratic 
counterparts. The final result was the largest voter turnout in any American national 
election in recent history. And, while this is by no means certain, many serious analysts 
now attribute the Republican margin of victory to their success in getting out the vote 
on Election Day. Moreover, this success evidently reversed what started out to be a 
clear win for the Democrats.  
Zack Exley, director of online communication and organization for Kerry-Edwards 
2004, was subsequently reported to have said in reference to the Republican voter 
mobilization campaign, that, “The right is beating the left at what used to be our game: 
grassroots politics, real democracy. Ironically, we were a little more ‘command and 
control,’ which doesn't really reflect the way the Democratic Party works.” (Exley, 
2004) 
 
THE EXAMPLE OF THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION GRID 
The search for consensus on organizational design and the types of practices that matter 
most to evolving public organizations is dramatically reflected in the US defense 
department experimentation with netcentric warfare. One might be inclined to 
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skepticism. Military organizations have earned a reputation for conservatism. In part 
this is a necessary consequence of their need for resiliency and reliability in the face of 
severe harm. Moreover, Fountain (2001a) has described the failure of an early 
experiment carried out by the U.S. Army’s 9th Mechanized Division (HiTech) at Ft. 
Lewis, Washington, with a network enabled information system. The failure of this 
experiment was at least partly due to the unwillingness of its senior officers to abandon 
hierarchy or to push their operating decisions down into the organization. Nevertheless, 
Hughes (1998: 5) reminds us that the very first netcentric organization may well have 
been the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s ARPANET project. Started in 
the late 1960s, the project was characterized by “a flat, collegial, meritocratic 
management style as contrasted with a vertical, hierarchical one; the resort to 
transdisciplinary teams of engineers, scientists, and managers in contrast to reliance on 
discipline-bound experts; the combining of diverse, or heterogeneous, physical 
components in a networked system instead of standardized, interchangeable ones in an 
assembly line; and a commitment by industry to change-generating projects rather than 
long-lived processes.” 
The U. S. defense department and the uniformed services are seriously trying to figure 
out how to utilize the power of IT to increase the agility of combat forces and the speed 
and effectiveness with which the military is deployed to achieve political ends without 
combat. The backbone of this initiative is the integration of the Department of Defense 
communications and computer systems into the Global Information Grid or GIG. In this 
article we present and analyze the GIG as if it was fully deployed by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), which is not the case presently but remains a goal and 
priority of the DOD. 
The GIG is conceived of as a distributed network designed to spread processing power 
across a network of thousands of processors, servers, and routers located around the 
world. The diverse computers that make up the network will be linked together via a 
communications system that automatically routes and relays information from source(s) 
to destination(s) through any available medium or node. The GIG’s communication 
system will use technologies pioneered by the Defense Advance Research Projects 
Agency’s packet radio project as well as landlines, both of which rely on the Internet’s 
open-systems standards and protocols to facilitate interoperability among its component 
elements. This communications network will allow the computers in the grid to 
exchange information, share workloads, and cooperatively process information to 
provide users with information about local operating conditions such as the status 
information on the enemy, friendly forces and neutrals, and terrain and weather 
information. Information will be supplied by users, local and regional sensors and 
processed by intelligent agents to help them figure what they need and to get it when 
they need it. Information and related services will be available to any and all ‘net-ready’ 
users, meaning connected to the GIG, with an adequate interface to enable the 
acquisition and presentation of information. For example, a rifleman’s processor could 
be a thin client dedicated to supporting a human-computer interface (with voice 
recognition, heads-up display, speech synthesis, and communications). It need not have 
its scarce computing capacity tied up providing other information-related services. 
Computing resources to support a user can reside anywhere on the grid.  
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When the GIG is complete, everyone in the American military will be able to 
communicate with everyone else on the basis of shared standards. The architectures of 
object-oriented programming and packet switching in telecommunications will 
eliminate the need to channel information, thereby eliminating the tradeoff between 
information richness and reach, or so its advocates claim. 
The grid is designed to be scalable to several levels or tiers of networks. At the highest 
level, it will comprehend all sensors, information processors, and users from satellites in 
geosynchronous orbits on down -- all the military’s processors, servers, and routers, the 
communications grid, and stored data and metadata registers and catalogs. Metadata 
describe and classify the information to which they are appended, including its source, 
description, intended use, pedigree, and security classification. Hence, they allow users 
to convert data into useful information. The next tier might be a wide-area network 
comprehending a regional command, the next a medium-area network comprehending 
all the combat and support teams conducting operations in an area, and finally a local-
area network comprehending the participants of a combat team or rapid reaction force. 
As with most high-tech organizations, the GIG will rely on quasi-market mechanisms to 
link customers and providers (sensors, weapons platforms, and intelligent agents, as 
well as people), and to ensure that users have access to the information and services 
(bandwidth, etc.) that they want when, where, and how they want it. Depending on the 
transaction, a user may be either a customer or a provider. Department of Defense 
policy envisions that users will post all of the information they collect or produce so that 
it can be immediately available to those who need it. In addition to tracking the progress 
of transactions and providing management for the system of exchange, the GIG 
infrastructure will supply: 
• Metadata posting and collection; 
• Searchable catalogs advertising the availability of services and information on 
the GIG. These catalogs will contain information that describes the capabilities 
of the service, the necessary inputs to use the service and the outputs of the 
service; 
• Discovery mechanisms to locate and identify information to support user 
tasks, including flexible access control mechanisms to facilitate information 
visibility and availability (while hiding information where there is an explicit 
need for security beyond that afforded by the network); 
• Agent-based mediation services to translate, fuse, and aggregate data elements 
into information to meet the needs of diverse users ranging from individuals to 
teams and organizations, and to sensors and/or weapons systems.  
These software agents will use metadata to package information for users. They are 
supposed to filter and deliver the right information to the right automatically. That is to 
say, these agents will be made aware of the user’s situation and information needs to 
provide relevant information without a specific user request. Software agents are 
intended to multiply the resources available to users by gathering and transforming raw 
data into actionable information to support operations, in the same way that users 
would, were the agents unavailable, thereby freeing them from routine information 
processing chores and allowing them to devote their attention to operations. 
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The GIG relies on workload sharing and packet switching for resiliency. The grid will 
operate reliably despite the destruction of many of its components or communication 
nodes because data and workloads can be stored and processed throughout the network 
and information is automatically routed through its undamaged nodes via surviving 
radio transmitters and landlines. Moreover, according to David Alberts and Richard 
Hayes (2003: 197) automatic packet-switching network protocols and algorithms could 
protect communications nodes in ways never before conceived through cover, 
concealment, and deception. For example, network-level protocols could make every 
node look the same (in a traffic analysis) as every other node, thereby limiting an 
adversary’s ability to identify and target high-value nodes such as command and control 
centers. Similarly, network-level protocols could, if the system detects an attack, change 
its waveforms to mimic a radar site or even the radio signals of an enemy unit. Finally, 
the Department of Defense is developing hard to intercept and detect waveforms for 
ground-based communication networks. 
It is a cliché to say that the World Wide Web like its namesake, is full of bugs and dirt. 
To defend against information attack, capture, or corruption the GIG will rely on 
commercial technology for conducting secure transactions, such as internet protocol 
security, secure socket layer, public key infrastructure and key distribution mechanisms, 
strong encryption algorithms, intrusion detection systems, and inexpensive biometric 
systems (fingerprint readers and retinal scanners). To protect against hackers, spyware, 
computer viruses, or massive denial of service attacks, the GIG will rely on approaches 
such as sandboxing, code-signing, firewalls, and proof-carrying code. However, as even 
its champions acknowledge, these approaches have yet to be implemented, tested, or 
standardized.  
Based upon most contemporary press coverage, the Iraq War represented the apotheosis 
of netcentric warfare. A more balanced discussion of events, written by Joshua Davis, 
appeared in Wired Magazine.  
The war was a grand test of the netcentric strategy in development since the 
first Gulf War. At least, that's the triumphal view from the Pentagon briefing 
room. But what was it like on the ground?… I tracked the network from the 
generals' plasma screens at Central Command to the forward nodes on the 
battlefields in Iraq. What I discovered was something entirely different from 
the shiny picture of techno-supremacy touted by the proponents of the 
Rumsfeld doctrine. I found an unsung corps of geeks improvising as they went, 
cobbling together a remarkable system from a hodgepodge of military-built 
networking technology, off-the-shelf gear, miles of Ethernet cable, and 
commercial software. (Davis, 2005) 
Nevertheless, Davis was favorably impressed with the system cobbled together. Known 
as “Geeks” to the soldiers in the field, the system tracked every friendly unit, weapons 
platform, and soldier in the theater and plotted their positions in real time on a digital 
map, together with all known enemy locations, plus a lot more: battle plans, intelligence 
reports, maps, online chats, radio transcripts, photos, and video. Soldiers accessed this 
system through a portal known as the Warfighting Web, which ran over the military’s 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network in much the same way as the public Internet. 
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Geeks facilitated the major operational innovation of the Iraq War: swarm tactics. In the 
earlier Gulf War, coalition forces advanced in a traditional linear formation, with each 
unit assigned sole responsibility for a specific portion of the front or held in reserve. 
Coordination was achieved and fratricide avoided through careful attention to the 
boundaries assigned the attacking units. Then, as each unit advanced, it would sweep its 
assigned corridor clear of adversary forces. If it met with unexpected resistance, higher 
command could redeploy neighboring or reserve units to overcome or in some cases 
seal off an exceptionally obstinate foe. Unfortunately, maintaining a continuous front is 
costly both in terms of manpower and equipment. Resources must be spread out all 
along the line and in echelon behind it. Moreover, units advancing in linear formation 
often cannot move any faster than their slowest element; they sometimes have no option 
but to engage forces blocking their assigned line of attack, battling on the periphery 
rather than going for the heart of the enemy’s defenses; and they are easy to locate and, 
therefore, attack.  
In the Iraq War, allied units were spread out like polka dots over the battle-space and 
charged with the destruction of enemy command, communications, and control centers, 
along with denying them supplies. When allied units encountered strong fixed defensive 
positions, they often merely noted the locations and by-passed them. Dangerous enemy 
offensive units were engaged and, through self-coordination of local air, land, and sea 
forces, overwhelmed. This was possible because Geeks allowed soldiers to keep track of 
each other, even when they were out of one another’s sight, and to come together 
rapidly and stealthily from all directions. Of course, dispersed attack formations avoid 
many of the drawbacks of a linear formations: forces are much more likely to be used to 
good effect, thereby saving on resources; the swarm can move forward as fast as its 
fastest elements – speed and surprise tend to degrade the efficacy of an adversary’s 
response (Coram 2002); dispersed forces are hard to attack and nearly impossible to 
attack successfully when they move faster and concentrate firepower more accurately 
than their opponents. The worth of dispersed formations in desert warfare is not a new 
discovery. German General Erwin Rommel used dispersed formations and swarm 
tactics against the British Army in North Africa during World War II, typically taking 
personal command at the most decisive spot of the operation. Although these tactics 
were evidently effective, visitors from the German General Staff were often 
nevertheless appalled by Rommel’s flagrant disregard for sound principles of war. 
The allied swarm used Microsoft Chat to coordinate action – concentrate, attack, and 
disperse, combine and recombine – of myriad, dispersed, maneuver units. When a 
problem developed, a soldier would radio a Tactical Operations Center, where the 
problem would be typed into a chat session and addressed by anyone online – from 
experts at the Pentagon to the AWACS overhead or combat teams nearby. According to 
Davis, not only did technology change the way allied forces maneuvered, it also 
changed the way they thought. 
On the negative side, several observers have noted that allied forces lacked a system of 
systems (Cordesman 2003; Boyne 2003). Many of the information systems available at 
the outset of the Iraq War remained service specific. As a consequence, a network had 
to be quickly improvised from these systems under difficult circumstances. Not 
surprisingly, this improvisation worked best between the highest levels of command. 
The net was probably weakest at the battalion level and below. But even platforms that 
were relatively well integrated into the net, U.S. Air Force fighter planes and bombers, 
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had problems with interoperability, communications, and data flow, as well as in 
procedures and computer support. These problems often showed up in an inability to 
redirect aircraft in mid-flight away from targets that had been destroyed or to surviving 
targets in a timely manner. As Cordesman (2003, 280) explained: 
The US and its allies simply [did not] have a fully effective and reliable set of 
sensors, processors, and methods to support netcentric warfare with reliable 
battle damage assessment or to provide such data quickly enough to support 
near-real-time allocation of force assets for either tactical or targeting 
purposes. 
Network communications problems also sometimes hindered the ability of logistical 
units to synchronize their movements with the combat teams they supported, causing 
delays in re-supply. Indeed, orders from higher commands often simply out ran the 
ability of lower level combat and support units to interact and coordinate with each 
other. These problems were evidently due to doctrinal and training failures as much as 
to technological and equipment failures, although Davis noted that one Army analysis 
of information problems during the Iraq War focused on the need for improved energy 
sources to replace batteries. 
The GIG is supposed to provide the information and telecommunication services needed 
to fix these problems, except perhaps for battery life. It will enhance the ability of 
soldiers to make sense of the situations they find themselves in and support 
collaboration, both of which are essential to promote a high level of shared awareness 
and to create the conditions needed for effective self-synchronization. However, the 
GIG will not fix what Cordesman (2003: 280) describes as the tendency of bandwidth 
creep “...to push information to virtually all potential users and to centralize decision 
making and review.” He concluded: 
It is far from clear that today’s problems are truly bandwidth problems as 
distinguished from a failure to create efficient systems that limit the need for 
bandwidth, and equally unclear that careful review has been made of where the 
flow of information should stop, of how much information can really be used, 
and of the need to delegate and limit information flow. (Cordesman (2003, 
280) 
The champions of netcentric warfare within the defense establishment go much further. 
They argue that dramatic changes must be made in the military culture, architecture, 
decision making processes, and operating routines to exploit the full promise of IT. In 
turn, these changes -- expanding lateral information flows; increasing connectivity and 
interoperability, collaboration, and experimentation, forming and deploying small, agile, 
specialized teams; and devolving much (but not all) command authority downward -- 
call for equally dramatic changes in the way military units are configured, trained, and 
equipped. 
One of the key change agents in this process is the defense department’s Command and 
Control Research Program, currently directed by David S. Alberts.  Dr. Alberts is 
Director, Research and Strategic Planning, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information Integration. The Command and Control Research Program 
has produced a series of reports dating back to the mid-1990s outlining the changes the 
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military must embrace to enter the information age (see text box). The most recent 
report in the series, Power to the Edge: Command...Control... in the Information Age 
(Alberts and Hayes, 2003), reiterates the conclusions of its predecessors but goes much 
further in emphasizing the importance of flattening command hierarchies and of 
devolving power down to combat and logistic teams. 
Although the Command and Control Research Program has not referenced this 
literature, the organization they prescribe is essentially Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s digital or 
netcentric organization. To those who have learned about the U. S. military from old 
war movies, this looks like an impossible stretch. To those more familiar with the 
modern military, however, Alberts and Hayes can be understood as saying merely that 
the armed forces as a whole should look more like the Special Operations Command, 
with its joint headquarters, exercises and training, tactics and doctrine, its relatively high 
degree of interoperability and equipment standardization, and its tailored task forces, 
composed of units that are brought together to accomplish a given mission or 
accomplish specified objectives, and are then reorganized or reconfigured to take on 
new responsibilities. Further, Alberts and Hayes’ combat and logistics units would look 
like special forces units: relatively small, highly skilled, multi-disciplinary teams, with a 
lot of rank, but not many levels of command (Alberts and Hayes, 2003). This would still 
be a big stretch, but almost by definition not an impossible one. 
At the same time that Alberts and Hayes call for the devolution of power to the edge, 
they are cognizant that authority, and accountability are essential features of any system 
of command and control. Organizations that fail to allocate responsibility for 
performance, to align responsibility with authority, or to hold individuals accountable 
for their exercise of responsibility and authority are predestined to muddle and the 
pursuit of sectarian interests. There point is that is possible to move from a “concept of 
command that is tied to an individual commander to a concept of command that is 
widely distributed.” (Alberts and Hayes, 2003, 45) 
Rather than issuing detailed orders about what to do, when to do it, where to do it, and 
how to do it or even specifying objectives each unit is to achieve, and leaving the details 
of when, where, and how to the units, Alberts and Hayes would have headquarters 
assign missions to the units involved, but leave decisions about how they are to be 
achieved to the units involved to workout for themselves – they refer to this decision-
making process as self synchronization. They assert that effective self-synchronization 
requires headquarters to provide a clear and consistent understanding of command 
intent; appropriate rules of engagement, and sufficient resources. These measures would 
high guide but not dictate details to subordinates. In addition, effective self-
synchronization requires quality information, shared situational awareness; and 
competence at all levels of the task force and 360-degree trust – in information, 
subordinates, superiors, peers, and equipment. 
The Network Centric Warfare concept of self-synchronizing forces is a 
statement of the requirement for massive improvements not only in flexibility 
but also in adaptability. The elements of such forces will need to be extremely 
competent and inspire confidence in the other force elements about that 
competence. They will also have to trust one another, recognizing the value of 
synergistic efforts and their ability to rely on one another to achieve them. 
They will need to be supported by networks that allow them not only to share 
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information but also the tools that they need to develop situation awareness and 
situation understanding. They will also need to task reorganize on the fly. 
(Alberts and Hayes, 2003, 144) 
To get from here to there, they rely on two critical assumptions. The first is that GIG 
will be constructed pretty much on time and on schedule. The second is that the 
American military will continue to experiment with netcentric warfare/organization, that 
its basic principles will be vindicated, and that this vindication will lead to consensus as 
to which practices matter, the recognition that these practices must be adopted together, 
as part of a complementary system, and, ultimately, to the willingness of people at the 
top of the uniformed services to share authority. 
So far, development and deployment of the GIG has remained pretty much on schedule. 
This success largely reflects the military’s willingness and ability to lavish resources on 
what is essentially an unproven concept. Few if any other organizations could afford to 
be so extravagant. The one area in which the GIG is admittedly behind schedule is in 
protecting the space-based segment of the GIG from attack, especially its resiliency in 
the face of information attack. This is not now a primarily a money problem. Rather, it 
seems that the military has so many platforms under development that there simply 
aren’t enough skilled aerospace systems engineers to go around. Since many of the 
platforms under development for the military reflect the assumptions of an earlier era, 
one might conclude that this constraint is a harbinger of more serious conflicts to come. 
Out point here is that the U. S. defense department’s resource allocation process, like 
most budgetary processes, is incremental in nature. It is better at preserving the human, 
material, and technological capacities of existing institutional arrangements and 
functional communities than at creating new ones. That conclusion holds a fortiori 
where it is necessary to scrap the old to bring into being the new. For the next few 
years, the American military can continue to pursue parallel tracks to the future, what 
Alberts and Hayes refer to as the modernization track versus the transformation track, 
but at some point migration paths from one track to the next must be put in place. 
Alberts and Hayes seem to agree, they argue that: 
[C]apabilities are usually a product of DoD’s stovepiped planning, budgeting, 
and acquisition processes (all of which are material-dominated) and a 
requirements process that is backward looking. While power is currently 
distributed, being vested in the Services and Agencies, this power topology is 
clearly antithetical to jointness and far from the warfighter edge. Over the 
years, there have been numerous attempts to improve the system to make it 
more joint and responsive to warfighters’ needs. To date, these efforts have 
been only marginally successful because they have not fundamentally 
transformed these processes into edge-oriented ones. The adoption of an edge-
oriented approach to the main function of DoD, the conduct of military 
operations, demands that these supporting processes be transformed as well. 
(Alberts and Hayes, 2003, 284) 
In other words, it is not certain that we get from here to there. The Air Force, which has 
thought long and hard about the need to make the transition to a space and air force, still 
has not figured out how to change its resource allocation process to make it actually 
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happen (Barzelay and Campbell, 2003). What Alberts and Hayes propose looks a lot 
harder. 
 
FROM THE NEW ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATION TO NETWORKS 
To make sense of these three stories, the idea of a value chain, one of the central 
organizing concepts in the contemporary management literature, is useful. A value 
chain is simply an arrangement of activities or tasks undertaken to add or create value. 
Economists presume that governance arrangements make value chains more efficient. 
That is, they are a means of managing the sum of transaction – search, bargaining, 
negotiation, and enforcement – and holding costs. This is an oversimplification, but it is 
often a useful starting place in the analysis of institutional arrangements. 
As we have seen, the traditional transaction cost framework posits two polar types of 
institutional arrangements: 
• The market, which at the limit is a completely deconstructed value chain 
• The hierarchical, vertically integrated organization, which at the limit is a 
completely self-contained value chain 
Of course, most real value chains are composed of both markets and organizations.  
There is often a tacit presumption in this sort of analysis that the mass production of 
manufactured goods is the normal mechanism through which organizations create value. 
Under this mechanism, the lion’s share of the value created derives from the production 
or fabrication process, a repetitive or cyclical process. Consequently, most of the costs 
incurred in creating value vary directly with the rate and/or volume of output. These 
presumptions imply a particular division of labor, one in which like activities or tasks 
are grouped together and performed sequentially and each node in the value chain or 
network is an event signifying completion of a discrete task. Hence, value chains are 
typically portrayed as linear networks of activities in which events follow sequentially 
from one to the next until the process culminates in the enjoyment of the good or 
service in question. A complex value chain might have many tributaries, but its flow is 
unidirectional. Except where so-called overhead services contribute to the value chain, 
its activities can be coordinated via simple push-pull mechanisms, with communication 
concentrated at the links in the process.  
There is another important tacit assumption in this sort of analysis: information is very 
costly and must be carefully husbanded. Consequently, this presumption further implies 
that the main issue confronted in the governance of value chains is vertical integration, 
not only to maximize economies of scale, but also to minimize overheads through 
economies of scope.  
In one of the most widely accepted formulations incorporating this perspective, two 
attributes of primary and intermediate products or services suffice to answer the 
question of how their place in the value chain should be governed: excludability and 
exhaustibility. Both non-excludability and non-exhaustibility give rise to divisible 
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prisoner’s dilemma games, which often preempt efficient voluntary governance 
arrangements and, where that is the case, call for coordination by fiat or hierarchy. 
The main normative prescription that flows from this perspective is that goods or 
services that are characterized by excludability and exhaustibility, so-called pure private 
goods, ought to be supplied via voluntary exchange, i.e., markets. Goods or services that 
are both non-excludable and non-exhaustible, so-called pure public goods, ought to be 
subject to hierarchical control. It is usually further presumed that a public-goods value 
chain involving final goods and services that benefit a large share of the citizenry should 
be managed by the state or one of its subsidiaries. This formulation logically suggests 
two additional patterns: excludable, non-exhaustible goods and services, so-called toll 
goods, and non-excludable, exhaustible goods and services, so-called commons goods, 
externalities, or spillovers. Under the old structure-conduct-performance paradigm the 
former called for some form of administered contract (at the limit, government 
regulation of price and entry) and the latter an M-form organizational design or, at the 
limit, government process controls to increase the spillover when a good or decrease it 
when a bad.  
Because value-creation strategies are usually conceived along product-market lines 
(single product, differentiated products, multiple products) and because the M-form 
structures provide a general manager for each product line (rather than for regions or 
functions), the M-form is broadly endorsed as the mode of organizing and managing 
large, multi-product organizations whose products are by definition heterogeneous. The 
broad outline of the M-form structure is one where substantial decisional authority is 
decentralized to agents, within the context of well-specified rules determining how 
agents will be rewarded for their efforts. According to this perspective, the management 
process mainly involves acquiring and deploying assets and, to influence this process, 
principals must establish a consistent set of delegated decisions, performance measures, 
and rewards. Organizational units in such a setup participate in quasi-voluntary value 
chains linked by transfer prices. Managerial rewards are based on economic quantities 
of interest to principals, such as returns on capital employed (holding plus embedded 
transaction costs). 
The final assumption of the structure-conduct-performance approach to transaction-cost 
oriented value-chain analysis is that the coordination of interdependent cooperative 
activities is easier under an organizational hierarchy than in markets. In turn, the 
coordination advantages of organizations supposedly derive from the internal 
homogeneity of their systems of internal contracts: communication systems, including 
budgets, incentive regimes and authority structures. A corollary of this assumption is 
that organizations that rely on a small number of suppliers or distributors can write 
contracts that will, at some cost, constrain the opportunistic behavior of those with 
whom they deal.  
There is a fair amount of evidence supporting the logic of this formulation. Arguably, 
for example, the main thrust of the regulatory reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s 
and the privatization of state-owned enterprises was to align governance mechanisms 
with the characteristics of the goods and services produced. In the private sector, 
mergers and acquisitions that conform to the dictates of this formulation are usually 
successful. Those that do not conform almost inevitably destroy stockholder value. 
Finally, in a study of defense businesses, Masten (1984) showed that non-exhaustibility 
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(economies of scale) and non-excludability (economies of scope) directly influenced 
vertical integration. Where intermediate products were both complex and highly 
specialized (used only by the buyer), there was a 92 percent probability that they would 
be produced internally; even 31 percent of all simple, specialized components were 
produced internally. The probability dropped to less than 2 percent if the component 
was unspecialized, regardless of its complexity. 
Nevertheless, it is increasingly apparent that the principles of hierarchy, levels of graded 
authority, and a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination and formal 
contractual mechanisms are at best imperfect solutions to the problems caused by 
divisible prisoner’s dilemma type games. A better way to conserve on transaction costs 
is through the elaboration of trust-based, relationships of mutual dependency. These can 
be reflected in intra-organizational cooperation or take the form of inter-organizational 
alliances. For example, Toyota’s legendary just-in-time manufacturing process, which 
produces dramatic reductions in components, work-in-progress, and finished goods 
inventories and thereby holding costs, does not depend on vertical integration. Instead, 
Toyota relies on a few suppliers that it nurtures and supports. The members of the 
Toyota alliance have substantial cross-holdings in each other and Toyota often acts as 
its suppliers’ banker. Toyota maintains tight working links between its manufacturing 
and engineering departments and its suppliers, intimately involving them in all aspects 
of product design and manufacture. Indeed, it often lends them personnel to deal with 
production surges and its suppliers accept Toyota people into their personnel systems.  
Toyota's alliance members share much more than a marketplace relationship with each 
other. In a very real sense, Toyota and its suppliers share a common purpose and 
destiny. Yet, Toyota has not integrated its suppliers into a single, large bureaucracy. It 
wants its suppliers to remain independent companies with completely separate books -- 
real profit/investment centers, rather than merely notational ones -- selling to others 
whenever possible. Toyota's solution to the cooperative games created by spillovers and 
toll goods appears to work just fine. Note that the means of reinforcing trust-based 
alliances often includes the exchange of hostages – surety bonds, the exchange of debt 
or equity positions, or quasi-vertical integration. Quasi-vertical integration is common 
in both the automobile and the aerospace industries, and, of course, it is standard 
procedure for the U. S. Department of Defense to provide and own the equipment, dies, 
and designs that defense firms use to supply it with weapons systems and the like.  
Moreover, modern information technology has made it economically feasible in a 
number of cases to exclude users and to design and apply demand-based multi-part 
tariffs to deal effectively with problems of non-exhaustibility, thereby deconstructing 
vertically integrated value chains. Under multi-part transfer prices, the service delivered 
is decomposed to reflect underlying cost drivers and priced accordingly (your home 
phone bill is an excellent example of a multi-part tariff). Even where sequential value 
chains remain bounded by a single organization, these innovations often allow intra-
organizational exchanges of services, tangible assets, knowledge, and skills to be 
governed by laissez-faire transfer prices, in which the buying and selling units are 
completely free to negotiate prices and to deal or not to deal.  
 
  
International Public Management Review - electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 9  Issue 1  2008  © International Public Management Network 
169 
 
Formerly, in most large complex organizations in the private sector, value chains were 
typically governed  by centralized resource-requirements planning systems. Even where 
transfer prices were used, the financial performance of a processing unit that contributed 
directly to a value chain was typically measured against a standard unit-cost target; staff 
units were not a direct component of the value chain and were typically treated as 
discretionary expense centers. Only final product-market lines were evaluated in terms 
of return on investment or economic value added. The reasons for this are complex, but 
they go to difficulties associated with expensing intermediate and joint products. 
Consequently, attempts to find the costs of intermediate and joint products or to price 
them were often either excessively arbitrary or prohibitively costly. In contrast, final 
products have always been relatively easy to price and expense following generally 
accepted accounting practice. Recent advances in information technology, managerial 
accounting, and organizational design have made it possible and, in some cases, 
beneficial to treat every responsibility center in an organization as an investment center, 
including those providing overhead services. Our basic point is that there is more than 
one way to skin a cat, to cite a familiar value chain problem. 
More significant, given our purpose, is the fact that technology, primarily information 
technology, but also the technology of social cooperation (mechanisms, processes, 
doctrines), has rendered traditional mass production methods obsolete by removing 
value added from the fabrication stage of many value chains. For many final goods and 
services, direct labor costs at the fabrication stage are now trivial and raw materials and 
components do not add value at that stage of the process. This means that most of the 
costs incurred in creating value do not vary directly with the rate and/or volume of 
output, but have other drivers. Moreover, modern fabrication technologies are largely 
available to any producer willing to make the necessary investment. 
In a typical modern hi-tech value chain, most of the value is added in product 
development and design, logistics, materials handling, delivery, post-delivery servicing 
and maintenance and in customer relations. In other words, overheads and purchased 
services and components account for ninety percent of costs. Consequently, value is 
now defined more in terms of the quality and heterogeneity of goods and services, their 
availability when and where they are wanted and convenience of use, and consumer 
awareness and knowledge of product or service attributes, than in terms of cost or price. 
This transformation reflects the fact that mass production entailed costs as well as 
benefits. These costs took the form of mismatches between individual tastes and 
preferences and product characteristics. The classic illustration of this phenomenon is 
Henry Ford’s dictum that customers could have any color Model T they wanted, as long 
as it was black (blue in Canada). This potential misallocation of resources arising from 
the mismatch between tastes and the product homogeneity induced by mass production 
is directly comparable to the problem of providing public goods in a jurisdiction where 
people have different preferences for the good (i.e., where people cannot vote with their 
feet and zoning doesn’t achieve efficient sorting) but face an identical tax price. In that 
case, where the quantity of the good provided is democratically determined (i.e., it 
reflects the preferences of the median voter), as we have seen, half of the citizens get 
more of the good than they want (they would rather not buy as much of the public good 
as they are made to) and half less (i.e., they would be willing and able to buy more). 
Technological changes mean that in many cases it is no longer necessary to bear these 
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costs to obtain the benefits of productive efficiency even where value chains are 
concerned with manufactured goods. 
Elsewhere the standard model of the value chain, based as it was upon the technical and 
social imperatives of the mass-production of manufactured goods, was probably never 
the best way to think about value creation. The delivery of services, for example, has 
generally involved at least some accommodation to the needs of the individual recipient. 
Treating service delivery, especially government service delivery, like manufacturing 
almost necessarily meant trying to fit it into Procrustean bed. Much the same could be 
said about the building and construction trades. Consequently, it may be argued that 
what has changed in recent years is that manufacturing has simply become more like 
other value creating activities. 
If true, these facts ought to change the way we think about value chains in some 
fundamental ways. Instead, of linear networks of sequentially dependent activities, it 
may make more sense to think of value-chains as parallel networks involving 
reciprocally interdependent relationships through which activities are simultaneously 
carried out. Consequently, critical paths or PERT networks are better metaphors for 
these value chains than are directed or linear graphs. This is the case because holding 
costs can often be minimized by parallel processing where all the participants in the 
value chain have full access to information about every aspect of the process. The 
activities and tasks that comprise a value chain and the technologies used to perform 
them still determine its optimal arrangement and its governance structure, but the main 
coordination problems to be solved nowadays typically involve horizontal rather than 
vertical integration. 
Unfortunately, the logic of horizontal integration isn’t very well developed or 
understood, in part because students of management haven’t fully appreciated the need 
to rethink the problem of coordinating activities when information costs are low or of 
organizing to create value via parallel processes. Organizational economists have been 
especially resistant to rethinking received doctrine. Fortunately, however, we have some 
empirical knowledge about managing projects, which is the closest analogue we have to 
the more general problem of horizontal integration (see Table 1). 
Table 1: The Logic of Horizontal Integration 

















within a single 
organization) 
Source: Thompson, 2006, 81. 
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The logic of transactions or information cost implies that networks are neither a distinct 
kind of relationship, nor necessarily superior in performance to other kinds of value 
chains, nor even uniquely more difficult to sustain than value chains comprehended by 
single organizations. “The principles of hierarchy,” “levels of graded authority,” and “a 
firmly ordered system of super- and subordination” are inimical to democracy.  They 
are also increasingly inimical to high performance. Nowadays, it seems clear that high 
performing entities are more likely to be designed around team-based collaborations 
that successfully spread authority and responsibility throughout the organization and 
thereby mobilize the collective intelligences of their members.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We believe that networks represent a means to move from bureaucracy and hierarchy as 
means for coping with complex problems to consensus decision making through the use 
of netcentric systems and quick learning in organizations. In this regard, we believe that 
networks can be influenced by stakeholders and participants, but cannot be "managed" 
per se. True networks of the type defined by Evans and Wurster (1997) cannot be 
managed. Instead, they evolve spontaneously as entities relatively free of control and 
management by any party. We acknowledge that there is a school of thought which 
views networks as manageable (see, for example, O'Toole and Maier, 2004: Kickert et 
al, 1997), but we do not agree with this perspective. 
With respect to how hyperarchy, netcentricity and quick learning can facilitate 
organizational decision making and action through the use of new technology, for our 
purposes it is reasonable to conclude that there is a hierarchy of technologies, from easy 
to hard, low risk to high risk, low payoff to high payoff that may be used to achieve 
desired results: 
• Standardized component 
• Standard formulation 
• Innovative formulation 
There is also a hierarchy of administrative applications that goes from redeployability 
to asset specificity. In most cases, this involves moving from a primary focus on 
dealing with process design consideration to a primary focus on dealing with process 
context factors. These include (a) the organization's mission and purpose, (b) its 
constitution or governance structure, (c) its culture and the basis of its strategic 
thinking, and (e) its installed knowledge base. Clearly in our view, the process design 
factors are easier to deal with than are the process content factors.  
Redeployable applications are what we usually think of when we talk about technology, 
i.e., equipment and operating software. Process design, organizational design, and 
capacity for use sometimes get lumped together under the rubric of business process 
reengineering, although there are distinct disciplines concerned with each of the three 
kinds of administrative applications -- process engineering, organizational design, and 
change management or knowledge management -- that focus upon the development, 
stabilization, and operation of job or organization-specific assets which can, in practice, 
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only be given meaning and effect by process context factors. Clearly, the basic payoff 
from ontinuous and substantial effort at investment in the 
first set of applications results from investment in the second. The focus of this 
article is on the use of information technology to improve communications and business 
efficiency for government departments and agencies. 
Governments at all levels are grappling with these issues. The issue that must soon be 
faced is: what do the new technologies mean for the democratic process itself and for 
the prospect of enhanced citizen engagement? Democracy may be easier to achieve in 
the workplace than in society. Work is central to our lives but government and its 
functions are not, which implies an important relational distinction. At work, 
participation in governance is a benefit, in society writ large it is a cost. For democracy 
to work as it should, this cost must be bourn but, the incentives to participate are so 
widely dispersed in society that the absence of participation is understandable, if 
regrettable. This fact explains why governments so often fail to manage their business 
affairs properly, why corruption is prevalent in democratic and quasi-democratic 
political systems, and why public organizations are so resistant to management reform.  
There is little reason to question the pace of change and contingency in the cultures and 
environments within which public organizations must operate in today's world, nor that 
public organizations of all types must respond to such change. Not all such change will 
involve evolution towards netcentricity and hyperarchy. More moderate adjustments to 
change are far more likely to be made before such organizations consider more radical 
reformulation of their design, structure and modes of operating internally an in 
conjunction with other organizational entities. However, we suggest that as a result of 
cultural and environmental change and increased contingency, some movement towards 
hyperachical design and netcentric operation is inevitable if public organizations are to 
become more responsive citizens and to their clientele base in the twenty-first century. 
As culture changes so must the organizations that serve the newly emergent demands 
and preferences of new culture and environmental circumstance. 
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